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11 Introduction
Pervasive understanding about the board￿ s retaining sub-standard CEOs is that CEOs have
the power to ￿re and hire the board members. (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, Warther 1998).
In order to reduce such power of CEOs, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent
rules by the NYSE and NASDAQ have mandated the presence of independent directors on
corporate boards. However, this paper shows that even if the board had almighty power
and there exists no information asymmetry between the board and CEO, the board does not
necessarily replace sub-standard CEOs. In other words, I show that the board sometimes
retains sub-standard CEOs because by doing so bene￿ts the board (alone).1
This is analyzed in the framework using take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er model between the board
of directors and the incumbent CEO: the board posts an o⁄er which the CEO must either
accept or reject. The o⁄er is about the wage of the CEO and hiring of a specialist who
reviews the CEO￿ s conduct. The distribution of the ability of the incumbent CEO and any
potential CEOs is assumed to be the same until the incumbent CEO is monitored by the
specialist. The pro￿t of the ￿rm is dependent on CEO￿ s ability. Then the conventional
understanding would be that the board posts an o⁄er of hiring the specialist by comparing
a trade-o⁄ between the positive e⁄ect of increase in the expected pro￿t and the negative
e⁄ect of hiring specialist (or the cost of monitoring): However, I show that there is another
cost that the board incurs: I refer to such cost as a ￿ leakage￿from the incumbent players
joint utility. That is, the incumbent CEO can obtain private bene￿t or the discounted sum
of his/her future wage if s/he is retained to the end of the game. If the board considers
such bene￿t is large, it can o⁄er the CEO a lower wage in exchange for giving him a longer
tenure (no monitoring). In other words, an exogenously given bene￿t is transferable to the
board￿ s utility if the board retains the incumbent CEO. Therefore, if the marginal pro￿t of
monitoring does not exceed the addition of the monitoring cost and the amount of ￿ leakage￿
from the expected joint utility of the incumbents, the board has an incentive to keep the
1Sato (2009) shows that the board of director is slow to replace the incumbent CEO when there is a




I identify two forms of corporate governance systems: the outside-recruiting system and
the internal-promotion system. In both systems, the board consists of one incumbent CEO
and n incumbent directors.2 Under the outside-recruiting system, if the incumbent CEO is
￿red, a new CEO is always hired from outside the incumbent board, and the board members
remain unchanged. Under the internal-promotion system, if the incumbent CEO is ￿red,
one of the incumbent directors is promoted to be the new CEO, and to maintain the board
size, a new director is hired. Therefore, under an outside-recruiting system, the newcomer
is the newly hired CEO. Under an internal-promotion system, it is the newly hired director.
Players: There are two players: the board of directors and the incumbent CEO. There
are n incumbent directors on the board, but they are treated as one player. The ability of the
CEO is either high (H) or low (L), determined by nature, with no one knowing the CEO￿ s
true ability. The distribution of the incumbent CEO￿ s ability is the same as any other CEO
potentials, and it is 1=2 for being H (L). Since the incumbent CEO is no di⁄erent from the
potential CEO, s/he does not have the bargaining power to negotiate his/her own wage with
the board of directors.3
Information Gathering Strategy: When the board hires the specialist to monitor the
CEO, the specialist gives the board the precise information about the CEO￿ s true ability
with probability one. Then, with probability q, the CEO is discovered to be of type H, and
with probability (1 ￿ q), type L. When the board does not hire the specialist, the board￿ s
prior belief about the incumbent CEO￿ s true ability remains unchanged. The incumbent
CEO is replaced with a new CEO when s/he is discovered to be of type L, but otherwise
s/he is retained. The payment to the specialist (monitoring cost) is a constant c.
2The ￿rm has n directors and one CEO in all stages.
3It can be considered that the incumbent CEO is new to the company and hence s/he does not have
￿rm-speci￿c knowledge yet.
3Payo￿s: The board objective is to maximize its utility: the pro￿t of the ￿rm, less the
monitoring cost and the wage of the CEO, where the pro￿t of the ￿rm is dependent on the
ability of the CEO.4 The pro￿t of the ￿rm is denoted as ￿N when the incumbent CEO is
retained without monitoring. This prior, and thus also the expected corporate pro￿t, is also
the same when the incumbent CEO is ￿red and a new CEO is hired. The expected corporate
pro￿t when the incumbent CEO is of type H is denoted ￿H, and it is denoted ￿L when s/he
is of type L. In short, ￿H > ￿N > ￿L is assumed.5 The CEO￿ s objective is to receive both
the wage and the non-contractable private bene￿t, such as reputation or status. The CEO
will receive the wage regardless of his/her situation, but the non-contractable private bene￿t
is only given to the CEO who is serving at the last stage of the game. The reservation utility
of the CEO is assumed to be r.
Timing: In the ￿rst stage, the board posts an o⁄er that the incumbent CEO must either
accept or reject. The board o⁄ers (p;w); where p 2 f0;1g : 0 meaning no monitoring by the
specialist and 1 meaning the existence of monitoring by the specialist. The specialist is hired
by the board of directors with the ￿xed cost of c. w is the wage o⁄ered to the CEO. To be
more precise, the board o⁄ers the incumbent CEO (p;w) = (1;w1) or (p;w) = (0;w0). In
the case of p = 1, with probability q, the specialist gives the board a precise information that
the CEO is of type H. With probability (1 ￿ q), the board receives a precise information
about the CEO￿ s ability to be of type L. In the second stage, the CEO accepts or rejects
the o⁄er. If the board had posted (1;w1); then the CEO is monitored and either retained or
￿red in the second stage. The pro￿t of the ￿rm is realized, and players receive their pro￿ts.
2.2 Game
The players￿expected utilities when the board o⁄ers (p;w) = (0;w0) In this case,
there is no monitoring, and hence, the incumbent CEO serves to the end of the game with-
out his/her ability being updated in either the outside-recruiting system or the internal-
4For the sake of simplicity, the board pro￿t equals the corporate pro￿t.
5The board ￿res the incumbent CEO who is believed to have the ability of L, and it replaces him/her
with a new CEO. Hence, ￿L is not realized.
4promotion system. In other words, all the incumbent players stays till the end of the second
stage, implying that there is no newcomer to the initial members. Thus, the expected util-
ities of the players are the same in both systems; the board￿ s expected utility is expressed
as
￿N ￿ w0; (1)
and the incumbent CEO￿ s expected utility is expressed as
b + w0: (2)
The players￿expected utilities for the case in which the board o⁄ers (p;w) =
(1;w1) In this case, utilities di⁄er between the two systems. This is because under an
outside-recruiting system, discovering that the incumbent CEO is of type L is synonymous
to saying that the incumbent CEO is ￿red and a new CEO is externally hired, whereas
under an internal-promotion system, it is synonymous to saying that the incumbent CEO
is ￿red and a new CEO is internally promoted. Therefore, the board￿ s expected utility in
outside-recruiting system is expressed as
q￿H + (1 ￿ q)￿N ￿ w
O
1 ￿ c; (3)




The ￿rst and the second terms of (3) represent the expected pro￿t to the board. (The board
￿nds the CEO to be of type H with probability q; and with probability (1 ￿ q); it ￿nds
him/her to be of type L and ￿res the incumbent CEO and hires a new CEO.) The third
term is the wage the board pays to the incumbent CEO, which is o⁄ered to him/her during
the ￿rst stage. The last term is the cost of monitoring.6 As for (4), the CEO receives wO
1
6If b > ￿N
n holds; the directors under both systems may conduct monitoring when the cost of monitoring
is small enough to satisfy q(￿H ￿ ￿N) ￿ (1 ￿ q)b > c: However, if the cost is q(￿H ￿ ￿N) ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿N
n >
c > q(￿H ￿ ￿N) ￿ (1 ￿ q)b; then only the directors under the internal promotion system monitor. If
c > q(￿H ￿ ￿N) ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿N
n ; then the cost of monitoring is too large, meaning that the directors do not
5whether or not s/he serves to the last stage of the game. However, s/he receives the non-
contractable private bene￿t b only when s/he is retained with probability q, and thus it is
expressed as such.
The board￿ s expected utility under an internal-promotion system is expressed as
q￿H + (1 ￿ q)
h






1 ￿ c; (5)




The CEO￿ s expected utility (6), is as (4). The di⁄erence between an outside-recruiting system
and an internal promotion system appears in the second term of the board￿ s utilities. With
probability (1￿q), the board ￿nds the incumbent CEO to be of type L, and hence, replaces
the incumbent CEO with a new CEO, who was originally one of the board members. Recall
that a new director is hired in this case to keep the board size at n: Thus, with probability




The board￿ s optimal choice Given these expected utilities, the board makes the
optimal choice in the ￿rst stage in o⁄ering (0;w0) or (1;w1); provided that the CEO will
accept the o⁄er in the second stage.
Under an outside-recruiting system, if the board posts (0;w0), the wage is determined as
to satisfy b+w0 = r; but if it posts (1;wO
1 ); the wage is determined to satisfy qb+wO
1 = r:7
Thus, the board￿ s optimal choice is made between (0;w0) = (0;r￿b) and (1;wO
1 ) = (1;r￿qb):
Plugging w0 = r ￿ b into (1) yields
￿N + b ￿ r: (7)
monitor in either system. The similar argument holds for the case in which ￿N
n > b holds.
7It is assumed that b > r: When the board o⁄ers (0;w0); the wage w0 is determined as to satisfy w0+b = r:
Since the CEO is sure to serve to the end of the game in case (0;w0) is o⁄ered, the CEO knows he will
eventually receive r > 0 . This is the same for an internal promotion system.
6Plugging wO
1 = r ￿ qb into (3) yields
q￿H + (1 ￿ q)￿N + qb ￿ r ￿ c: (8)
Therefore, the board decides whether to hire the specialist or not by comparing (7) and (8).
When b is su¢ ciently small, (8) > (7) holds, and as a result, the board posts (1;wO
1 ): When
b is large, (8) < (7) holds, and as a result, the board posts (0;w0). Recall that b is the
non-contractable private bene￿t which is given only to the CEO serving at the last stage
and will be regarded as ￿ leakage￿by the incumbent board if the incumbent CEO does not
receive this. Thus, if the leakage of b is large, the board posts (0;w0) so as not to replace the
incumbent CEO.
Under an internal-promotion system, the wage level is determined to satisfy b + w0 = r
when the board posts (0;w0); while it is determined to satisfy qb + wI
1 = r when it posts
(1;wI
1). Thus, the board makes the optimal choice between (0;w0) = (0;r￿b) and (1;wI
1) =
(1;r ￿ qb). Plugging w0 = r ￿ b into (1) yields
￿N + b ￿ r: (9)
Plugging wI
1 = r ￿ qb into (5) yields
q￿H + (1 ￿ q)
h




+ qb ￿ c ￿ r: (10)
The board￿ s decision to post an o⁄er to monitor or to not is determined by comparing (9)
and (10). When
￿N




n is su¢ ciently large, (10) < (9) holds, and as a result, the board posts
(0;w0). In this system, a pay to the new director
￿N
n ; is the ￿leakage,￿and again, if the
amount of ￿ leakage￿is large, the board chooses not to monitor in order to avoid the leakage.
De￿nition:￿ leakage￿is de￿ned as an expected pro￿t that is lost from the incumbents￿joint
expected utility. This leakage occurs to the incumbents￿pro￿ts when the incumbent CEO is
replaced, the replacement of which leads to a member-change within the incumbent members.
7Proposition 1:
(1) If b >
￿N
n ; the board under the internal-promotion system is more likely to replace
the substandard CEO.
(2) If b <
￿N
n ; the board under the outside-recruiting system is more likely to replace the
substandard CEO.
Proof : Comparing (8) and (10), it is straightforward to show that when b >
￿N
n ; the
board under the internal-promotion system is more likely to post (1;w1), but when b <
￿N
n ;
the board under the outside-recruiting system is more likely to post (1;w1).
Above proposition implies that the monitoring that is intended to ￿re the incumbent
CEO induces a ￿ leakage￿to the incumbent members￿joint expected utility, and because of
this, whether to hire the specialist to monitor the CEO is not solely determined by a trade-o⁄
between the positive e⁄ect of increase in the expected pro￿t (which is shown by ￿H ￿ ￿N)
and the negative e⁄ect of monitoring cost c: That is, if the marginal pro￿t of monitoring
exceeds the addition of the monitoring cost and the amount of ￿ leakage￿from the expected
joint utility of the incumbents, the board has a stronger incentive to hire the new CEO,
and thus, posts an o⁄er of ￿ monitor.￿In other words, if the amount of ￿ leakage￿is large, the
board does not monitor for the sake of reducing the risk of having ￿ leakage￿ . Notice that the
board has to consider which type of ￿ leakage￿(b or
￿N
n ) it will incur if it is given the option
of choosing where to bring the next CEO from.
3 Conclusion
This paper concerns one of the reasons that causes ine¢ cient monitoring of the CEOs by
the board of directors. I use take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er game to analyze the process of how a
board of directors bene￿ts from retaining a CEO who maybe sub-standard compared to the
potential CEOs. In other words, the incumbent board members incur a ￿ leakage￿if there is
a member change, resulting in a pay the incumbent board thus cannot receive. Under an
outside-recruiting system, if the initial CEO does not receive the non-contractible private
8bene￿t b; it is considered as a ￿ leakage￿ , whereas under an internal-promotion system, if
the board has to promote one of the inside directors to the CEO and thus has to re￿ll the
board, the new director￿ s pay of
￿N
n is a ￿ leakage￿ . Thus, the board￿ s incentive to replace the
incumbent CEO is attenuated.
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